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RECENT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NoTEs-INDORSEMENT IN BLANK FoLLOWED BY SPECIAL
INDORSEMENT-Plaintiff purchased a cashier's check from X Bank payable
to himself. He indorsed the check ·in blank and immediately below stamped it,
"Pay to the order of Bank of America, National Savings and Trust Association,
S. & R. Produce Co." Plaintiff then gave the check to one R with whom he
had agreed to enter into business under the name of the S. & R. Produce Company. R took the check to Y Bank which at his request blocked out the special
indorsement without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff. R then indorsed
the check and deposited it to his personal account. X Bank paid the check on
presentment. In an action against both banks to recover the amount of the
check alleged to have been paid to R wrongfully, held: the status of the check
as a bearer instrument from plaintiff's indorsement in blank was unaffected by
the subsequent special indorsement; Y Bank therefore took title to it by delivery
as a holder in due course, and X Bank was bound to pay on the presentation
of Y. Christian v. California Bank, (Cal. 1946) 173 P. (2d) 318.
It is generally conceded that according to the Law Merchant a special indorsement of an order instrument controlled a prior indorsement in blank making
the instrument negotiable only by further indorsement. 1 The common law, however, took a different turn when Lord Kenyon in Smith v. Clarke 2 held that an
order bill which became payable to bearer by a blank indorsement could thereafter
be negotiated by delivery even though subsequently specially indorsed. This rule
became generally accepted both as to order 8 and bearer 4 paper. The doctrine
of Smith v. Clarke was repudiated however by the English Bills of Exchange
Act which included a section providing that, "A bill is payable to bearer ••.
on which the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank." ;'I Chalmers,
the draftsman of the Bills of Exchange Act, stated that this section was intended
to bring the law into accordance with mercantile practice by making a special
indorsement control a previous indorsement in blank. 6 This provision, with
1 McKeehan, "The Negotiable Instruments Law: a Review of the Ames-Brester
Controversy," 50 AM. L. REG. (o.s.) 437 at 455 (1902); Brannan, "Some Necessary
Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law," 26 HARV. L. REv. 493 at 501
(1913); CHALMERS, BILLS OF ExcHANGE, 5th ed., 24 (1896). Bigelow, however,
was under the impression that Smith v. Clarke, infra, was expressive of the Law Merchant. BIGELOW, BILLS AND NOTES, 3d ed., § 260 (1928).
2 Peake 225, l Esp. 180, 170 Eng Rep. 320 (1793).
8 Vanarsdale v. Hax, (C.C.A. 8th, 1901) 107 F. 878; Watervliet Bank v. White,
I Denio (N.Y.) 608 (1845); Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29 (1876); Huie v.
Bailey, 16 La. 213 (1840).
4 Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex. 212 (1878); Mitchell v. Fuller, 15 Pa. St. 268
(1850), instrument drawn payable to drawer and indorsed by him in blank; see also
Savannah Natl. Bank v. Haskins, IOI Mass. 370 (1869). Contra, Meyers v. Friend
and Scott, 22 Va. 12 (1821).
5 Bills of Exchange Act, 45 & 46 Viet., c. 61, § 8 (3) (1882).
6 CHALMERS, BILLS OF ExcHANGE, 5th ed., 24 (1896).
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only slight change in phraseology, was written into section 9 (5) 7 of the N.I.L.
for presumably the same reason. The N.I.L., however, contains another pertinent provision not found in the Bills of Exchange .Act. Section 40 of the
N.I.L. states that "Where an in~trument, payable to bea.r'er, is indorsed
specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery; but the person
indorsing specially is liable as indorser to only such holders as take title through
his indorsement." The first half of this section appears to be a codification of
the rule of Smith v. Clarke and there is evidence that the draftsman of the
N.I.L. so regarded it. 8 The apparent conflict between sections 9 (5) and 40
was one of the points of controversy in the Ames-Brewster debates.9 The most
satisfying construction of the two sections seems to be that first .suggested by
McKeehan 10 to the effect that section 40 should be construed as applying
only to those instruments drawn payable to bearer, 11 and that section 9 (5) restricts an order instrument indorsed in blank and subsequently indorsed specially
from being negotiated by delivery. In Parker v. Roberts,1 2 however, there is
authority for the view that section 40 enacts the rule of Smith v. Clarke. Since
the principal case involves an order instrument indorsed in blank. and then
specially indorsed, it would seem that the better construction of sections 9 (5)
and 40 would have the special indorsement govern. Without reference to the
act, however, the court assumes that the blank indorsement is controlling. Y
Bank's obliteration of the special indorsement at R's request is justified by the
court on the ground that the holder of a negotiable instrument may at any time
7 "An instrument is payable to bearer . . . when the only or last indorsement is
an indorsement in blank."
8 Crawford in his notes to § 40 states· that -"This section makes no change in the
law'' and cites Smith v. Clarke, Peake 225, l Esp. 180, 170 Eng. Rep. 320 (1793),
and Johnson v. Mitchell, 50 Tex. 212 (1878). However, in the same note, the
draftsman of the N.LL. also states that "The section cannot apply where the paper is
originally made payable to order and indorstd,in blank; for by, section 9, a note or a
bill which, upon its face, is payable to order, becomes payable to bearer only when -the
last [sic] indorsement is in blank; and hence, when a blank indorsement is followed by
a special indorsement, the instrument is not within tlie terms of section 9." CRAWFORD, ANNOTATED NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw 83 (1918). Clearly, if the latter
statement is the correct interpretation of the section there has been a change in the law.
9 See the compilation of these debates ccmtained in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 3d ed., 423-426 (Ames), 439-442 (Brewster), 449-450 (Ames),
459-460 (Brewster) (1919).
10 McKeehan, "The Negotiable Instruments -Law: A Review. of the AmesBrewster Controversy," 50 AM. L. REG. (o.s.) 437 at 461 (1902).
11 Brannan suggests that § 40 should apply to those instruments expressly indorsed
"Payable to bearer'' as well as those drawn so payable. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 3d ed., 492, note 2 (1919).
12 243 Mass. 174, 137 N.E. 295 (1922). A blank indorsement of a note by the
payee was followed by two special indorsements. Plaintiff was in possession of the note
but did not allege or prove title through any indorsement. Defendant maker pleaded
want 'Of consideration and fraud. Held, plaintiff took title by delivery and was thus a
holder in due course free from the defenses.
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strike out any indorsement not necessary to his title. 13 Nor was it held that the
special indorsement was notice to Y Bank of any suspicious circumstances which
would impair its status as a holder in due course. There is, however, one argument overlooked by the court which could be advanced to support the stn1dng
of the special indorsement, without assuming the point in controversy. Apparently R was a partner in the firm that signed the special indorsement. As such
he might be entitled to strike out a partnership indorsement leaving the instrument payable to bearer. H. this had been established, the court's result could be
reached consistently with what seems to be the enlightened interpretation of
sections 9 (5) and 40 of the N.I.L. Apparently, too, the check had never been
delivered to the special indorsee. It is unfortunate that the decision should follow Parker v. Roberts in adding to the body of authority developing on this
interesting question without the guidance of a construction of these sections.
J. R. Swenson

13 N.I.L., § 48: "The holder may at any time strike out any indorsement which is
not necessary to his title. The indorser whose indorsement is struck out, and all indorsers subsequent to him, are thereby relieved from liability on the instrument."

